Ideas from 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction' by Georges Rey [2013], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

---

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori

20298

The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy

20300

Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions

20293

Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed

20294

'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity

20297

Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable

20301

The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used

20302

An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical)

20303

Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique

20299

If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical?